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This paper analyzes the effects of inter-industry and firm size 
on wage differentials, focusing on how their estimated effects vary 
by  the  introduction  of  elements  indicating  firm  characteristics  such 
as  wage-experience  profiles.  Using  the  worker-establishment  matched 
data, we find that inter-industry effects are larger than firm size 
ones  judging  from  their  explanatory  powers  and  the  wage  distributions 
caused by them although the introduction of firm characteristics 
reduces more the effect of industry. Since this paper is based on 
the efficiency wage hypothesis to explain wage differentials, it is 
required to test for the bonding critique. Checking how steeper wage 
profiles affect wages of young workers, we find that even those who 
work at firms where wage profiles are steeply rising are not paid 
lower. This result supports the efficiency wage hypothesis to be a 
good explanation for wage differentials. 
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 11. Introduction 
Previous studies on wage differentials generally show that 
industry and firm size play an important role in the determination 
of wages. The approach used most often is to estimate the effect of 
either variable in wage regressions, controlling for the other in 
addition to worker characteristics such as age, tenure, sex, and 
education, and then to check how their estimated coefficients and 
explanatory powers are in the estimation where the other variable 
is  included.  Interestingly,  in  so  doing  it  has  rarely  questioned  which 
variable is more crucial for explaining wage differentials.  
This question is important particularly for two reasons. One 
is that both the effects of industry and firm size are explained by 
the similar factors such as ability to pay, rent-sharing, efficiency 
wages, non-wage job attributes, labor quality” and so on, as 
summarized in next section. Then, the problem of which, industry or 
firm size, more firmly captures such factors can arise. The other 
reason  is  that  in  reality  firms  directly  determine  wages,  negotiating 
with workers in some cases, and hence the effects of industry and 
firm size come through their wage policies. In other words, since 
any industry or firm size can be attached to any firm, the effects 
of industry and firm size are fully nested within some effects of 
firms’  characteristics.  This  aspect  makes  us  strongly  recognize  that 
it is necessary to introduce firm characteristics such as wage 
policies into the estimations of industry and firm size effects. 
We have three main aims in this paper. As implied above, the 
first one is to analyze how the effects of industry and firm size 
vary by the introduction of elements indicating the attributes and 
wage policies of firms into estimations. In particular, the effects 
of slopes of wage-experience profiles are focused on.  
The second aim is to test the efficiency wage hypothesis, on 
which  many  researchers  depend  for  explaining  inter-industry  and  firm 
size  effects  on  wage  differentials.  This  hypothesis  claims  that  firms 
raise  not  only  the  wage  levels  but  also  the  steepness  of  wage  profiles 
to deter worker shirking, to suppress worker quitting or to hire 
high-quality workers. It is assumed in our analysis that a firm has 
to pay a higher wage as its wage profile becomes more steeped and 
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aspects for it.  
The  third  aim  is  to  investigate  the  effectiveness  of  the  bonding 
critique to the efficiency wage hypothesis. It is criticized that 
since firms are assumed to determine efficiency wages without regard 
to labor market conditions, many workers will apply to firms paying high 
wages, and then their initial wages can decrease, clearing the labor 
market. This paper will test this criticism by analyzing the effect of 
steeper wage profiles on young workers’ wages. 
For our analysis we utilize worker-establishment matched data. 
This data set was obtained by matching the micro data from the “Wage 
Structure  Basic  Survey”(Ministry  of  Health,  Labor  and  Welfare,  2000) 
with that from the “Employment Administration Survey for Female 
Workers”(Ministry  of  Health,  Labor  and  Welfare,  2000)  From  the  former 
we  can  get  information  on  individual  workers’  wage,  age,  sex,  tenure, 
education, occupation and industry, and from the latter the 
employment condition of individual establishments, for example, the 
number  of  employees,  the  ratio  of  female  workers,  that  of  part-timers 
and personnel hierarchical structure. Fortunately, since the number 
of observed workers in each establishment is more than twenty, we 
can  estimate  a  wage  function  for  each  establishment  using  labor  market 
experience as an explanatory variable and know the slope coefficient 
of its estimated wage profile. According to Calvo and Wellisz(1979), 
Lazear  and  Moore(1984),  Malcomson(1984),  Gibbons  and  Waldman(1999), 
for instance, the wage profile can be considered to represent 
eloquently the firm’s wage policy concerning human investment, 
workers’ incentive and the need for skilled workers. 
     This paper is organized as follows. In the section 2 previous 
studies on efficiency wages are summarized. Section 3 describes the 
data used and defines the variables. Section 4 discusses the results 
on the determinants of inter-industry and firm size wage 
differentials  and  interprets  them.  Section  5  discusses  some  problems 
concerning our approach which uses the wage profile of each firm as 
an explanatory variable. In Section 6 the contents of this paper are 
summarized.  
 
 32 Previous Studies 
This section does not aim to comprehensively survey previous 
studies, but to show similarity in the interpretations concerning 
the effects of industry and firm size on wage differentials. That 
is, it will be discussed that explanations for them are the same in 
essence between industry and firm size although they slightly very 
to the extent that firms and industries are different. For example, 
according  to  Summers  and  Kruger(1988),  industry  shows  how  jobs  differ 
in required skills and work circumstance, how it is difficult for 
firms to monitor workers’ effort and how the product market is 
competitive. Note that these interpretations also hold in the 
different firm sizes. 
To begin with, the monopoly power explanation proposed, for 
example,  by  Weiss(1966)  and  Mellow(1982)  is  traditionally  prevalent. 
In  more  concentrated  industries  large  firms  enjoying  greater  monopoly 
power can earn more excess profits and may share those with workers. 
However,  as  discussed  by  Brown  and  Medoff(1989),this  traditional  and 
institutional explanation faces a difficult problem of explaining 
why  profit-maximizing  firms  pay  more  than  the  market  wages  which  make 
it  possible  to  allure  qualified  workers  but  not  overpaid  in  otherwise 
firms. One of the reasons why firms pay higher wages is provided by 
strong  union  power  or  threat  of  unionization.  However,  it  is  necessary 
for the union power hypothesis to explain why there are large 
differences  even  in  industries  with  smaller  threats  or  no  possibility 
of unionization. 
The traditional theory of equalizing differences in the labor 
market developed by Rosen(1985) considers that inter-industry wage 
differentials  are  compensating  ones  for  non-wage  job  attributes  such 
as  working  conditions  and  physical  and  mental  hardness.  Unfortunately, 
however, it seems not to be supported by empirical studies. For 
example,  Kruger  and  summers(1986)  shows  that  the  inclusion  of  several 
working condition variables in a standard wage equation hardly 
affects the estimated industry wage premiums. Also in Japan 
Tachibanaki and Ohata(1994) and Tachibanaki(1996) find no evidence 
of compensating wage differentials among firms of different sizes腃
arguing that differences in compensations are enlarged in fringe 
 4benefits, as found by Freeman(1981)  
According to Hamermesh(1980),the size-wage effect is caused by 
the fact that larger firms employ more skilled workers because they 
use  more  capital-intensive  technology,  and  hence  it  is  more  efficient 
for them to hire workers with better skills. Oi(1983) also addressed 
that large firms tend to rely on more complex and state-of-the-art 
equipment  and,  hence,  experience  more  frequent  changes  in  equipment. 
These characteristics found in large firms predict a greater return 
to  on-the-job  training  under  the  existence  of  complementarily  between 
human capital and physical capital. Importantly, Hamermesh and Oi 
considered that the accumulated human capital cannot be fully 
captured by the traditional variables such as tenure and education 
and  that  firm-size  can  contribute  to  capturing  the  human  capital  more 
firmly. 
The effects of Labor quality are also controversial in the 
discussions  of  industry  effect  as  well  as  in  firm  size.  In  particular,  
Murphy  and  Topel(1987)  find  that  about  two-thirds  of  the  wage  premiums 
are caused by unobserved worker characteristics such as ability, but 
Krueger and summers(1988) and Gibbons and Katz(1992) argue, based 
on  the  longitudinal  data  on  workers  who  switch  jobs  between  industries, 
that true wage differentials exist across industries and that the 
effect of unobserved ability is limited. 
In line with the efficiency wage hypothesis, Bulow and 
Summers(1986) and Garen(1985) address that technologies of 
monitoring the performance of employees can vary across firms of 
different  sizes,  that  is,  monitoring  is  more  difficult  in  large  firms, 
and, hence, they are in favor of higher wages and less monitoring. 
Krueger and Summers(1988) also relied on efficiency wages to explain 
why  inter-industry  wage  differential  are  sizable  and  persistent,  even 
after controlling for observed worker characteristics and union 
status. They stress the importance of monitoring difficulty among 
industries. However, as noted by Dickens and Katz(1987), 
inter-industry wage differentials are highly correlated across 
occupations. That is, when one occupation in the industry is highly 
paid,  other  occupations  in  this  industry  also  tend  to  be highly paid.  
Weiss and Landau(1984) analyzed recruitment and selection 
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by manipulating a wage and a hiring standard under imperfect 
information on labor quality. In their model firms have to pay high 
wages  to  hire  workers  with  high  labor  quality  since  there  is  a  positive 
correlation  between  a  worker’s  reservation  wage  and  his  labor  quality. 
It is crucially assumed in their efficiency wage model that, as the 
number  of  new  employees  to  be  hired  increases  the  number  of  applicants 
per vacancy decreases due to the limitation of available labor pool. 
This  implies  that  firms  employing  a  large  number  of  workers  are  forced 
to pay high wages to satisfy the required level of hiring standard. 
Montgomery(1991) and Lang(1991) developed recruiting models, 
which  pay  attention  to  costly  search  behaviors  of  firms  for  recruiting 
workers. They address that costs particularly produced by unfilled 
vacancies  differ  among  firms  such  that  the  costs  are  larger  for  firms 
of which workers are productive due to high capital intensity or 
profitability, and hence they will offer higher wages to decrease 
the probability of their vacancies going unfilled. Thus 
inter-industry wage differentials can be persistent in the 
competitive labor market. 
Recently, Zabojnik and Bernhardt(2001) presented a tournament 
model  to  explain  for  the  observed  size-wage  effect  and  inter-industry 
wage differentials. They insist those firms, which are larger, more 
technology intensive, and more profitable, are able to provide more 
efficient incentives by corporate tournaments, thereby leading 
workers to accumulating more general human capital and to receiving 
higher wages. 
As shown above, most of the recent interpretations on 
inter-industry  and  firm  size  effects  depend  on  efficiency  wage  models 
 6to  make  their  discussions  reconcile  more  with  the  competitive  theory
1. 
Unfortunately, however, efficiency wage models are often too vague 
to test, as discussed by Manning(2003). Therefore, it is important 
for us to find appropriate variables indicating efficiency wage 
aspects more directly. Based on the discussions by Calvo and 
Wellisz(1979), Lazear and Moore(1984) and Malcomson(1984), we 
consider here that firms solve the efficiency wage problems not only 
by offering higher levels of wages but also manipulating slopes of 
wage profiles. 
 
3 Data and Variables 
     As mentioned in Section 1, one of the major aims in this paper 
is to explicitly take account of the effect of firm characteristics 
on wage levels. Due to data limitation, at least in Japan, it has 
been difficult for us to simultaneously obtain information on 
individual workers’ and firms’ characteristics. Fortunately, 
however, we could now match two data sources, the “Wage Structure 
Basic Survey” and the “Employment Administration Survey for Female 
Workers”, but only in 2000. The former data contains information on 
individual employees’ characteristics such as age, tenure, sex, 
schooling and wages, and the latter on firms’ characteristics such 
as employee size, the numbers of female workers and managerial, and 
unionization. It is unfortunate that information on sales, profits 
and productivity were not collected in the Administration Survey
2. 
                                                  
1 There is another line of research, which focuses on the impact of 
technological  change  on  the  wage  structure.  As  surveyed  briefly  by  Bartel 
and  Sicherman(1999),  these  studies  found  a  positive  correlation  between 
industry wages and technological change, using industry-level measures 
of technological change such as the capital to labor ratio, the 
industry’s  use  of  patents  and  productivity  growth.  Interestingly,  Bartel 
and Sicherman argue that the wage premium associated with technological 
change is primarily due to the sorting of more able workers into 
industries with higher rates of technological change.
 
2 In Japan Mitani(1997) also used the same kind of matched data as ours, 
focusing on the effect of firms’ employment administration for female 
employees on wage differentials, but only for Osaka Prefecture. 
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the sample size of the Wage Survey is about 0.5 million individual 
workers employed in about 50 thousand establishments. In turn, the 
Administration  Survey  contains  about  7,000  samples  of  establishments. 
Since each of the surveys does not target to collect information on 
the same establishments, merging two sources reduces our sample size 
to about 30,000 workers in 800 establishments, which are managed by 
different firms.  
The definitions and the basic statistics of the variables used 
in our analysis are shown in Table 1. The natural logarithm of the 
hourly  earnings  of  a  worker  is  defined  as  ln_wage,  which  is  calculated 
as annual earnings including bonuses divided by annual hours worked. 
The annual earnings include overtime payments, but excludes various 
types of allowances such as alimony and commutation. 
The variables listed from exp to female which are obtained from 
the Wage Survey, represent worker characteristics, and those from 
per_uni to union from the Administration Survey” do establishment  
attributes. The key variable, exp_hat, which is regarded as showing 
the firm’s wage policy, is defined as the marginal effect of 
experience in the wage equation, which is estimated for each 
establishment in the following form. 
u female uni wage + + + + + = 4 3
2
2 1 exp exp ) ln( ) 1 ( β β β β α , 
where exp stands for the labor market experience of workers, uni for 
the dummy variable of university graduator, female for the dummy of 
sex  and  u for the  random  term.  By  differentiating  the  right-hand  side 
in the estimated equation with exp, we obtain  exp 2 2 1 β β + . 
Substituting exp with 20 years, which is about the average labor 
market experience of workers in our sample, we get the slope of the 
wage profile, that is, exp_hat
3.  
 
4 Empirical Results 
4–1 Industry vs. Firm Size  
                                                  
3  We also calculated exp-hat by substituting exp with the average labor 
market experience of workers for individual establishments, and used 
them for the analysis. The results are basically the same as those 
obtained by using exp-hat in the text. 
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explanatory  variables  are  only  worker  characteristics,  that  is,  sex, 
experience, tenure and education
4. As shown in equation 1 of Table 
2, the effects of all these variables which have expected signs are 
statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. As shown 
below, it should be stressed here that the coefficients of them are 
stable, regardless of the various ways of inclusions of the other 
variables. These results are consistent with those of the previous 
studies in Japan
5.  
More  precisely,  first,  it  can  be  found  from  equation  1  to  4  in  Table 
2 that wages for female are about 17% lower more than those for male. 
Second, both the parameters on experience and tenure are positive, 
and the parameters of square terms are negative, as expected. It is 
interesting to note here that the negative coefficient of exp2 is 
smaller than that of tenure2 although the positive coefficient of 
exp  is  larger  than  that  of  tenure.  This  suggests  that  wages  are  growing 
with experience and tenure, but tenure exerts stronger influence on 
wages  than  experience  as  workers  become  elder  and  have  longer  tenure. 
This  has  been  regarded  as  one  of  the  striking  features  of  the  Japanese 
labor market
6. Lastly, education contributes to higher wages. Wages 
for university graduates are about 33% higher more than those for 
senior high-school graduates, and junior-college graduate are about 
17%  higher.  In  turn,  wages  for  junior  high-school  graduates  are  12.1% 
lower than those for senior-high school graduates. 
Table 2 also shows the estimated equations including industry 
dummies and firm size (the logarithm of firm size) as explanatory 
variables. We find in equation 2 that the industry dummies, whose 
basis is textile industry, are significant at the 1% level of 
confidence except in the industry of fabricated metal products whose 
coefficient is nearly zero, and in equation 3 that the effect of firm 
size is also statistically significant. Note here that the inclusion 
of industry dummies to the basic equation increases the adjusted 
                                                  
4As for the education dummies, senior high school graduate is the 
reference. 
5  See  Genda(1998),  Tachibanaki(1996)  and  Tachibanaki  and  Ohta(1994),  for 
example. 
6  See Hashimoto and Raisian(1985) for this aspect. 
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R  by 0.042 and that of firm size only by 0.002. Thus, judging from 
the adjusted 
2
R , the explanatory power of industry is much larger 
than that of firm size. 
The difference in the explanatory power between industry and 
firm size does not mean decisively that the wage differentials 
produced by firm size are smaller than those by industry. According 
to equation 4 in Table 2, where worker characteristic, industry 
dummies and firm size are used as explanatory variables, the highest 
wage differential among industries is 0.495 in proportion, of which 
value can be obtained by calculating the gap between the highest 
coefficient of electricity industry, 0.414, and the lowest of 
transportation and communication, -0.081. It is interesting to know 
to  what  extent  firm  size  should  differ  in  order  to  make  up  this  highest 
differential among industries. Taking into consideration that the 
coefficient of firm size is 0.044 in equation 4
7, we find that the 
logarithm of the number of employees to make up for the largest 
industry  differential  in  proportion  is  11.25(=0.495/0.044),  that  is, 
the  difference  in  firm  size  must  be  more  than  73,000  employees.  There 
is not such a big firm in our sample. 
The above discussion comparing the maximum wage differentials 
between industries and firm sizes is only an example and not so 
meaningful. Rather it is important to compare the wage distribution 
due to different industries and that due to different firm sizes, 
controlling for the effects of the other variables on wage 
differentials.  
Table 4 describes the coefficient of variation (C.V.) of 
estimated wage differentials weighted by the number of workers in 
industries or firm sizes. More specifically, the C.V. of the wage 
differentials due to different firm sizes is calculated as follows. 
First, we calculate the predicted values of wages for firm j whose 
size is  , from the estimated equation transformed in the following  j L
                                                  
7  Manning(2003) estimated the elasticity of wage with respect to 
employment to be in the region of 0.04, the estimate of which is similar 
to ours. 
 10way. 








j j X O L w γ β δ ∑ ∑
= =
+ = , 
where   is the estimated coefficient of firm size,  δ ˆ
i γˆ  is that of 
industry  dummy  ,  and   is that  of  the  other  explanatory  variable, 
, such as experience. Note here that the standard deviations of 
the estimated wage distributions, which are also shown in Table 4, 
are dependent on the value of the second exponential in the right 
hand side of equation (2), but the coefficient variations are not
i X k β ˆ
k O
8. 
That is, the C.V. is dependent only on   and  . Similarly, we can 
also calculate the C.V. of industry. Thus the indexes of Table 4 show 
the  “pure”  size  of  the  wage  distribution  caused  by  different  industries 
or firm sizes. 
δ ˆ
j L
According to Table 4, wage differentials by industry effects 
are larger than those by firm size. For instance, see the result of 
the simulation based on the estimated equation including personnel 
characteristics, industry and firm size as explanatory variables. 
The C.V. of industry is 0.101, which is more than two times larger 
than that of firm size, 0.037. Table 4 shows that this tendency holds 
even if firm characteristics are added to the explanatory variables. 
Thus, as far as our data concerns, industry wage differentials are 
larger than firm size ones.  
Note here that our data consists only of employees who work in 
large firms employing 100 and more regular workers. Therefore, it 
is quite possible that firm size wage differentials estimated above 
are biased downward. However, our main target is not to strictly 
compare  wage  differentials  caused  by  industry  and  those  by  firm  size, 
but to know how the introduction of firm characteristics will reduce 
estimated wage differentials and hence which is more closely related 
to efficiency wage aspects. 
                                                  
8  Krueger  and  Summers(1988)  calculated  the  standard  deviation  concerning 
the  effect  of  industry,  adjusting  for  the  standard  errors  of  the  industry 
coefficients. 
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4-2 Effects of Firm Characteristics 
From our matched data we can obtain information on 
characteristics of firms and establishments where workers are 
employed,  as  listed  in  Table  1.  Among  them  the  most  important  variable 
for our analysis is the slope of wage profile of the firm, that is, 
exp_hat.  This  is  because  it  can  be  considered  to  represent  efficiency 
wage  aspects  more  directly  than  industry  and  firm  size.  That  is,  firms 
make wage profiles steeper to deter worker shirking, to suppress 
quitting or to hire high-quality workers
9. This policy, however, is 
not costless for two reasons
10. One is that when capital markets are 
imperfect, steeper wage profiles force workers to consume less in 
the early period, leading to reduce their discounted utility over 
the lifetime. To cover this reduction firms must pay more. The other 
is that the steeper wage profile is risky for a worker because the 
firm may take the bond and fire the worker, claiming that he has 
shirked or because the worker has to quit the firm for the other 
reasons beyond his control such as ill health. This risk requires 
firms to pay higher wages to the worker. It is assumed here that as 
the wage profile becomes more steeped, the firm has to pay higher 
wages. 
Equation 5 in Table 4 shows that the slope of wage profile of 
the firm has a positive effect on wages, as expected, and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. It is 
interesting that the explanatory power is higher than that of firm 
size but smaller than industry. That is, the adjusted R squared, 
2
R , in equation 5 with exp_hat included as explanatory variables 
is  0.645,  which  is  between  the 
2
R  of  equation  3  with  firm  size,  0.637, 
                                                  
9   There is another reason why firms offer steeper wage profiles. 
According to Mincer and Higuchi(1988), rapid technical changes and 
productivity growth need greater human investments in workers on the 
job, making wage profiles steeper. This problem will be discussed in 
Section 5. 
10  See Lazear(1981) and Carmichael(1985) for this topic. 
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Firm characteristics other than exp_hat also play an important 
role in explaining wage differentials. Equation 7 shows that, except 
for increases in part-time workers(inc_p) and ratio of chiefs in 
establishment, they are statistically significant at the 10% level 
of confidence. Furthermore, by comparing equation 6 and 7 we know 
that the inclusion of the other firm characteristics raises the 
adjusted R squared by 0.009.  
From equation 7 we can point out some interesting results in  
the following way. First, the result that the higher proportion of 
university graduates raises wages seems to support the efficiency 
wage hypothesis and the O-ring theory. In line with Akerlof(1982) 
it can be considered that when there are many university graduates 
who are generally high-wage workers, firms pay higher wages even to 
low-wage workers because of sociological reasons or that in the 
adverse case firms suppress wages to high-wage workers. The O-ring 
theory proposed by Kremer(1993) claims that, since many production 
processes consist of a series of tasks, any of which dramatically 
affects the product’s value, firms attempt to hire high-quality 
workers  in  any  job,  leading  to  a  positive  correlation  among  the  wages 
in  different  occupations  within  an  establishment.  The  negative  effect 
of the proportion of part-time workers(per_part) on wages can be 
explained similarly. 
Second,  interestingly  the  effect  of  the  proportion  of  department 
managers(per_gem) is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level of confidence. Our interpretation is that since promotion 
to  a  general  manager  has  many  kinds  of  important  values  for  employees, 
firms providing many posts of general managers might be able to get 
down wages without depressing employees’ incentives. In turn, the 
proportion of section chiefs(per_chief) has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on wages. This holds even if 
per_gem is excluded from the estimation. Thus per_chief seems not 
to  be  effective  for  elevating  employees’  incentives.  This  is  because 
most of university graduates can become section chiefs in general. 
But it is hard to explain why the effect of per_chief is positive
11. 
                                                  
11  From interviewing a personnel staff, one of the authors got a hint 
 13Third, employment growth has an important effect on wage 
differentials. Equation 7 shows that the dummy variable showing the 
employment growth of regular workers in the past 3 years(inc_r) has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on wages. In turn, 
the dummy showing the reduced number of regular workers(dec_r) has 
a  negative  and  statistically  significant  effect.  These  results  appear 
to support the recruiting models developed by Montgomery(1991) and 
Lang(1991). 
Finally,  unionism  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  wages 
although its effect on wages for male workers and that for female 
differ greatly. That is, the marginal effect of the former is 5.8%, 
and that of the latter is 3.9%, which is obtained by reducing the 
effect  of  the  interaction  term  (union_f).  Interestingly  this  implies 
that unionism enlarges wage disparity between sexes because the 
difference in the average wage between both sexes is 17.9%, as known 
from the coefficient of female dummy in equation 7. These effects 
of unions are different from those obtained by Tachibanaki and 
Noda(2000) and Tsuru(2002). Their studies generally showed that the 
effect of unions on wages is not statistically significant at the 
ordinary level of significance after controlling for firm-size. 
Furthermore,  Tachibanaki  and  Noda  found  even  that  the  effect  of  unions 
on female employees can be positive.  
The differences in the results among our analysis and those 
referred  above  are  due  to  the  data  sources.  Tachibanaki  and  Noda  used 
model wage figures which unions use to compare wages of workers with 
the  same  age  and  tenure  among  different  firms.  Tsuru  interviewed  each 
employee to collect information for a questionnaire in Tokyo area. 
As pointed out by Tachibanaki and Noda, the use of the Wage Structure 
Survey published by the Ministry of Labor is desirable because its 
number of observations is large and because several important 
variables on individual workers are available. Unfortunately, 
however,  it  does  not  contain  information  on  unionization.  Our  matched 
                                                                                                                                                  
for  an  explanation.  According  to  the  staff,  the  span  of  control  of  section 
chiefs is recently narrowing because computerization makes the role of 
section chiefs more important in processing much information, and hence 
the ratio of section chiefs increases in some companies. In turn, the 
establishments which are highly computerized are productive and pay 
higher wages. However, this explanation is still tentative.  
 14data  now  made  it  possible  to  link  information  on  wages  and  individual 
workers’ qualifications with the union status of each worker. 
Our main concern is to analyze the effects of efficiency wage 
aspects on wage differentials by looking at how the inclusion of the 
slope of wage profile changes the estimated coefficients of industry 
dummies and firm size and the 
2
R s. According to the comparison 
between equation 4 in Table 2 and equation 6 in Table 3, the values 
of  the  coefficients  of  industry  dummies  drastically  change although 
they  all  keep  statistical  significance  at  the  5%  level  of  confidence. 
In particular, the coefficients of all the industry dummies were 
decreased by the inclusion of exp_hat
12 . The industries whose 
coefficients were decreased in a great extent, that is, by more than 
0.04, are mining, machine, electricity and trade.  
Comparing equation 4 and 7, we know that the inclusion of other 
firm  characteristics  in  addition  to  exp_hat  also  drastically  changes 
the  coefficients  of  the  industry  dummies.  The  coefficients  of  mining, 
construction, electricity, trade and finance industries, where 
higher wages are paid except in trade industry, were reduced by more 
than  0.05.  It  is  also  interesting  that  in  the  industries  such  as  food, 
nonferrous metals, fabricated metal products and transportation, 
where wages are relatively low, the coefficients were decreased, but 
in a small scale. Thus we can say that the inclusion of firm 
characteristics  affects  the  industry  effects  so  as  to  reduce  the  wage 
differentials  among  different  industries.  Table  4  shows  that  the  C.V. 
of wage distribution due to different industries was decreased from 
0.101 to 0.094 by 0.007 after firm characteristics were controlled 
in addition to firm size and personnel characteristics. 
The  effects  of  firm  size  are  affected  in  the  same  way  as  industry 
effects.  Comparing  equations  4  and  7,  we  can  know  that  the  coefficient 
of firm size was decreased from 0.044 to 0.042 by 0.002 due to the 
inclusion of firm characteristics. As a result of this decreases in 
                                                  
12Note here that Textile industry is chosen as the reference of the other 
industry dummies because there are a large number of workers employed 
in textile industry and because lower wages are paid. 
 
 15the firm size coefficient, the wage distribution caused by different 
firm sizes was reduced from 0.037 to 0.036 by 0.001. This reduced 
amount of C.V. is smaller than that of industry, 0.007. That is, it 
is quite possible that industry effects represent efficiency wage 
aspects more than firm size ones. 
 
2-3 Alternative Approach  
In this section, from another point of view, we will see the 
estimated results. As shown in Table 2 and 3, when personal and firm 
characteristics  are  added  as  explanatory  variables,  the  coefficients 
of  industry  dummies  and  firm  size  became  smaller.  In  order  to  analyze 
how the inclusion of these variables affects the estimated 
coefficients of industries and firm size, we calculate the biases 
caused by the omissions of worker and firm characteristics using 
equation 7. More specifically, let us define β1,i as the coefficient 
of the dummy of industry i estimated without worker and firm 
characteristics as explanatory variables, β2,i as that with them and 
β2,k.as the estimated coefficient of the other variable k. Then 
β2,I-β1,i  is  equal  to  Σγki  *  β2,ki,  where  γki  is  the  estimated  coefficient 
of  industry  dummy  i  obtained  by  regressing  each  of  the  other  variables 
such as firm characteristics on industry dummies
13. 
Table 5 gives the values of the omitted biases, Σγki * β3,ki, and 
the contribution ratio of each of the omitted variables. According 
to  this  table,  the  average  bias  of  industry  dummies,  which  is  weighted 
by the number of employees, is 0.230 and its 85% is caused by the 
omission of worker characteristics such as tenure and experience. 
It  is  interesting  that  the  bias  caused  by  the  omission  of  wage  profiles 
is  larger  than  that  caused  by  the  other  firm  characteristics.  In  turn, 
the bias of firm size is mainly due to the omissions of tenure and 
school, and the other firm characteristics are relatively 
contributive to the bias. 
These results suggest that the industry wage differentials 
seemingly observed reflect mainly differences in worker 
characteristics among industries and somewhat those in the wage 
strategy of firms. As for the seeming wage differentials among firms 
                                                  
13  See Greene(2003, chapter 8), for example. 
 16of different size are due to differences in education, tenure and 
the firm characteristics other than wage profiles. 
 
5. Some Problems 
Using  the  slope  of  wage  profile  to  estimate  a  wage  function  might 
be exposed to two criticisms. One is that the slope of wage profile, 
which is implied by efficiency wage models, is not effective for 
analyzing wage levels because it is suffering from the bonding 
critique. The other is that since firms simultaneously determine 
slopes  of  wage  profiles  and  wage  levels,  the  former  must  be  endogenous 
in the analysis. We will deal with these problems in this section. 
Against efficiency wage models there is a criticism that since 
firms are assumed to determine efficiency wages without regard to 
labor market conditions, many workers would apply to firms paying 
high wages. That is, critics of efficiency wages argue that job 
searchers who want a job in high-wage industries should propose to 
accept a lower wage in the form that they post a bond at the time 
of  hiring.  If  firms  caught  the  workers  shirking  or  being  unqualified, 
the firm could dismiss the worker and forfeit the bond. If it is not 
the  case,  the  firm  returns  it  to  the  worker  at  the  time  of  retirement.  
According to Carmichael(1990), firms can use many types of 
devices such as tournaments, promotions and upward-sloping age-wage 
profiles to have the worker pay the bond or the entrance fee. These 
devices make it possible for the firm to pay lower than the market 
wage to the new worker in response to labor market conditions. This 
leads to the conjecture that the steeper the age-wage profile of the 
firm  the  lower  the  wage  in  the  early  period  of  employment.  This  section 
will test this conjecture. 
Panel A in Table 6 shows the estimated wage equations including 
the interaction terms of exp_hat and age groups
14 as explanatory 
variables. Note here that the interaction terms for the age group 
with ages 24 and less and that with ages 25-29 are negative and 
statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level.  However,  the  coefficient 
of  exp_hat  which  is  significant  at  the  5%level  of  confidence  is  large, 
i.e., 0.657 while the interaction terms for workers with ages 24 and 
                                                  
14  The reference is the group with ages 30-34. 
 17less and those with ages 25-29 are small, i.e., –0.517 for the former 
and  –0.507  for  the  latter.  In  addition,  each  of  the  estimated  standard 
errors of both the interaction terms is small. These assure that, 
when the data separated by age group is used for the estimations, 
exp_hat  has  a  significant  effect  for  all  age  groups,  as  shown  in  Panel 
B of Table 6. But the effect of exp_hat for workers with ages 25-29 
is not significant at the 10% level of confidence while those for 
the other age groups are. Therefore, it is possible that the exp_hat 
for the age group with ages 25-29 are less than zero, but its 
probability is quite small. Thus we can conclude that even young 
workers who work at firms where wage profiles are steeply rising are 
not paid lower. 
How can we interpret that steep wage profiles have positive 
effects on wage levels in general? The most standard explanation is 
provided by human capital theory, as follows. Young workers start 
their  work  life  at  different  levels  of  productivity  depending  on  their 
innate ability and education, and accumulate human capital through 
on-the job training in firms where they are employed. Since in the 
process  of  training  some  workers  learn  more  and  some  less,  their  wage 
profiles come to differ. Two problems, however, remain in this 
explanation. One is to explain the reason why workers learn more in 
some firms and less in others even if their levels of education and 
ages are the same. The other is related to competition implied by 
the  bonding  critique.  If  there  is  a  firm  that  supplies  much  investment 
in OJT to its employees, many workers apply for it and hence the 
initial wages should decrease. 
To solve the first problem, firm characteristics such as 
technical change must be introduced. As shown by Mincer and 
Higuchi(1988), larger investments in workers on the job were 
increased  in  industries  which  experience  more  rapid  technical  change 
and  productivity  growth  in  Japan.  Greater  demand  for  training  is  also 
explained by firm size, as discussed in Section 2. In addition, 
workers are innately heterogeneous in learning ability that is a 
crucial determinant of productivity over the life cycle. More 
specifically, in order to make OJT training more efficient it is 
important  for  firms  to  hire  workers  with  high  ability.  However,  firms 
 18cannot sufficiently observe workers’ ability at the time of hiring 
and at least in the early stages of employment. Education provides 
only  imperfect  information  about  ability,  and  hence  firms  use  several 
sorting devices such as interview and the brand of school name. Thus 
workers with high ability will be employed in firms where better 
training programs are provided and wage profiles are steeply upward 
although there can be existent some workers with low ability due to 
wrong sorting. The important thing is that efficiency wages work to 
allure  for  high  quality  workers,  as  implied  by  Weiss  and  Landau(1984). 
Critics of efficiency wages may argue that young workers pay 
an entrance fee in the form that they receive wages which are lower 
than their labor productivity. The effectiveness of this discussion 
depends on tow assumptions. One is that young workers with high 
quality  can  be  more  productive  even  if  their  human  capital  investment 
is more than that of workers with low quality in the earlier stage 
of  employment.  The  other  is  that  labor  productivity  is  firmly  captured 
at  the  time  of  hiring  so  that  the  entrance  fee  to  pay  can  be  determined 
in the labor market. These two assumptions seem to be demanding in 
reality. 
Farber and Gibbons (1996) developed the learning model to 
disentangle two basic findings. One is that the estimated effect of 
schooling  on  the  wage  differentials  is  independent  of  a  worker’s  labor 
market experience against the expectation that the role of schooling 
in the inference process on his/her ability declines as performance 
observations accumulate in the labor market. The other is that 
time-invariant variables correlated with innate ability but 
unobserved by employers are increasingly correlated with wages as 
experience  increases.  They  argue  that  if  education  is  correlated  with 
innate ability, two findings cannot be explained consistently by 
human capital considerations. To defend the attempt in this paper 
we consider that firms mainly use education to sort workers among 
occupations, such as production work and managerial, and that they 
determine whether to hire them for an vacant occupation, based on 
the other more effective signals such as certain test scores and the 
results of interview. Therefore, if occupational variables such as 
industry are controlled, as done in this paper, the problem pointed 
 19out by Gibbons and Farber can be mitigated in some extent. 
Next, we will deal with endogeneity. The results obtained in 
the former sections imply that firms tend to pay higher wages in the 
later periods of employment, thereby resulting in steeper wage 
profiles.  Therefore  our  assumption  that  the  slope  of  the  wage  profile 
is an explanatory variable might be criticized from the ground that 
steeper wage profiles are the results of higher wages and hence must 
be endogenous.  
To  reply  to  the  above  criticism,  we  first  note  that  steeper  wage 
profiles  require  firms  to  pay  higher  wages  basically  for  three  reasons. 
The first is that greater human investments in workers and steeper 
wage profiles show the larger demand for high-quality workers, as 
discussed  above.  The  second  is  that  when  capital  markets  are  imperfect, 
steeper wage profiles force workers to consume less in the early 
period, leading to reduce the discounted utility over the lifetime, 
and  hence  firms  are  required  to  pay  more.  The  third  is  that  the  steeper 
wage  profile  is  risky  for  a  worker  because  the  firm  may  take  the  bond, 
claiming that the worker has shirked. Therefore, the worker demands 
higher wages over the lifetime.  
The first reason among the three implies that technical change 
is  a  determinant  of  the  slope  of  wage  profile.  Therefore,  if  technical 
change is exogenous to the firm’s decision on the wage policy, then 
so  is  the  slope  of  wage  profile.  As  for  the  second  and  the  third  reasons, 
it can be considered that since the structure of wage profile is 
determined based on the long-term contract between the firm and the 
worker,  the  firm  cannot  flexibly  change  it  in  response  to  fluctuations 
in the short-term conditions such as profitability. Furthermore, in 
order to change the wage profile keeping the total cost of wages 
constant, the firm has to cut down some employees’ wages. It is, 
however, difficult for the firm to accomplish this policy in the 
shot-run. That is, usually it takes much time to change the wage 
profile since the firm changes it using the average wage increment 
determined every year in the Spring Wage Offensive (Shunto). To sum 
up, our assumption that the slope of wage profile is exogenous is 
not so inappropriate in our cross-sectional analysis. 
 
 206 Conclusions 
          This paper attempted to empirically analyze the effects of 
inter-industry and firm size on wage differentials, focusing on how 
their estimated effects vary by the introduction of elements 
indicating wage policies of firms such as wage-experience profiles. 
Using the worker-establishment matched data, we found that 
inter-industry effects are larger than firm size, judging from their 
explanatory powers on wage differentials and the wage distributions 
caused by them, although the introduction of firm characteristics 
into the estimations reduces more the effect of the former. 
 Firm characteristics can be considered to represent efficiency 
wage aspects more directly than industry and firm size. Here it is 
interesting to know that the effects of industry and firm size still 
remain  even  after  controlling  for  firm  characteristics.  This  implies 
that industry and firm size include not only efficiency wage aspects 
but  the  other  factors  such  as  the  monopoly  power  in  the  product  market 
and technology, which are not controlled in this paper.  
     This paper also insisted that slopes of wage profiles have an 
effect on wage differentials on the basis of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis. However, the hypothesis is suffering from the bonding 
critique,  which  argues  that  job  searchers  who  want  a  job  in  high-wage 
industries should propose to accept a lower wage by posting a bond 
at the time of hiring. This paper tested for the bonding critique 
by checking how steeper wage profiles affect wages of young workers. 
The result is that even those who work at firms where wage profiles 
are steeply rising are not paid lower. This result supports the 
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 24Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
female Dummy for Female Workers 0.207 0.405
exp Experience 19.469 11.599
exp2 Square of Experience 5.136 4.979
tenure Tenure 16.903 11.377
tenure2 Square of Tenure 4.151 4.445
jh Junior high graduate
 (1) 0.065 -
hs Highschool (Reference Group) 0.481 -
jc Junior College graduate
 (1) 0.127 -
uni University/Grad school graduate
 (1) 0.327 -
per_uni Ratio of University graduate to regular workers 0.304 0.237
per_part Ratio of Part-timer to all workers 0.080 0.132
union_f Female * Union dummy 0.169 0.375
per_fem Ratio of Female regular workers 19.454 19.368
per_gm Ratio of General Manager at establishment 3.350 3.958
per_chief Ratio of Chief at relevant establishment 9.009 8.053
a_age_m Average Age of Male regular worker 40.409 3.272
a_age_f Average Age of Female regular worker 33.650 4.494
inc_r Regular Worker increased
 (2) 0.191 -
dec_r Regular Worker decreased
 (2) 0.689 -
inc_p Part-timer increased 
(2) 0.423 -
dec_p Part-timer decreased
 (2) 0.279 -
union Union dummy 0.889 -
exp_hat Slope of wage profiles in worker's establishment 0.029 0.011
mining Mining 0.002 -
const Construction 0.017 -
food Food/Beverages, Tobacco and Feed 0.033 -
texti Textile (Reference Group) 0.008 -
lumber Lumber, Wood products, Furniture and Fixtures 0.004 -
pulp Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 0.094 -
chemi Chemical 0.145 -
ceramic Ceramic, Stones, Clay Products 0.029 -
iron Iron and Steel 0.038 -
nonfer Nonferrous metal 0.040 -
fab_met Fabricated metal Products 0.030 -
machine General Machinery 0.030 -
ele_mach Electrical Machinery 0.087 -
transp Manufacture of Transportation equipment 0.108 -
precision Manufacture of  Precision Instruments 0.082 -
electricy Electricity, Gas, Heat supply and Water 0.033 -
trans_com Transport and Communications 0.006 -
trade Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurant 0.032 -
finance Finance and Insurance, Real Estate 0.036 -
service Services 0.147 -
ln_size Logarithm of Number of Employees at Firm 7.004 0.760
Note(3) The reference group is "Textile".
Note(1) These are dummy variables on workers' education whose reference group is "High school
Note(2) These are dummy variables on employment growth whose reference group is "Not Changed".
 Number of Observations 29771
  Size of Firm
Table 1   Basic Statistics
  Characteristics of Worker
  Characteristics of Firm/Establishment
  Industry Dummy
(3)
 
 25 26l_hwage3 Coef. Std.Err. P Coef. Std.Err. P Coef. Std.Err. P Coef. Std.Err. P
female -0.168 0.004 0.000 -0.179 0.004 0.000 -0.168 0.004 0.000 -0.180 0.004 0.000
exp 0.038 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.000
exp2 -0.064 0.002 0.000 -0.063 0.002 0.000 -0.064 0.002 0.000 -0.062 0.002 0.000
tenure 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000
tenure2 -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.013 0.002 0.000 -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.013 0.002 0.000
jh -0.140 0.007 0.000 -0.118 0.007 0.000 -0.143 0.007 0.000 -0.121 0.007 0.000
jc 0.212 0.005 0.000 0.170 0.005 0.000 0.212 0.005 0.000 0.169 0.005 0.000
uni 0.371 0.004 0.000 0.333 0.004 0.000 0.371 0.004 0.000 0.330 0.004 0.000
mining 0.360 0.032 0.000 0.402 0.032 0.000
const 0.220 0.017 0.000 0.224 0.016 0.000
food 0.092 0.014 0.000 0.085 0.014 0.000
lumber 0.170 0.026 0.000 0.180 0.026 0.000
pulp 0.307 0.013 0.000 0.309 0.013 0.000
chemi 0.224 0.013 0.000 0.223 0.013 0.000
ceramic 0.116 0.015 0.000 0.106 0.015 0.000
iron 0.138 0.014 0.000 0.107 0.014 0.000
nonfer 0.094 0.013 0.000 0.083 0.013 0.000
fab_met 0.007 0.015 0.616 -0.013 0.015 0.367
machine 0.097 0.014 0.000 0.091 0.014 0.000
ele_mach 0.236 0.013 0.000 0.207 0.013 0.000
transp 0.156 0.013 0.000 0.121 0.013 0.000
precision 0.128 0.013 0.000 0.119 0.013 0.000
electricy 0.427 0.015 0.000 0.414 0.014 0.000
trans_com -0.073 0.023 0.001 -0.081 0.023 0.000
trade 0.178 0.015 0.000 0.160 0.014 0.000
finance 0.354 0.014 0.000 0.360 0.014 0.000
service 0.274 0.012 0.000 0.261 0.012 0.000
ln_size 0.025 0.002 0.000 0.044 0.002 0.000
_cons 2.549 0.006 0.000 2.360 0.013 0.000 2.371 0.016 0.000 2.069 0.019 0.000
Nobs 29771 29771 29771 29771
F-value 6475.530 2315.140 5802.260 2280.45
Adj-R2 0.635 0.677 0.637 0.6819
Table2  Wage Equations
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
 
 27                                    Table 3 Wage Equations
l_hwage3 Coef. Std.Err. P Coef. Std.Err. P Coef. Std.Err. P
female -0.166 0.004 0.000 -0.178 0.004 0.000 -0.179 0.009 0.000
exp 0.037 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.000
exp2 -0.062 0.002 0.000 -0.061 0.002 0.000 -0.060 0.002 0.000
tenure 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.000
tenure2 -0.011 0.002 0.000 -0.014 0.002 0.000 -0.015 0.002 0.000
jh -0.132 0.007 0.000 -0.116 0.007 0.000 -0.114 0.007 0.000
jc 0.207 0.005 0.000 0.168 0.005 0.000 0.154 0.005 0.000
uni 0.353 0.004 0.000 0.318 0.004 0.000 0.294 0.004 0.000
per_uni 0.093 0.009 0.000
per_part -0.145 0.013 0.000
per_fem 0.001 0.000 0.000
per_gm -0.002 0.000 0.000
per_chief 0.001 0.000 0.001
a_age_m 0.009 0.001 0.000
a_age_f -0.002 0.000 0.000
inc_r 0.010 0.006 0.063
dec_r -0.015 0.005 0.003
inc_p 0.001 0.004 0.850
dec_p -0.010 0.004 0.010
union 0.058 0.006 0.000
union_f -0.019 0.010 0.050
exp_hat 4.276 0.144 0.000 3.476 0.140 0.000 3.124 0.148 0.000
mining 0.350 0.032 0.000 0.286 0.032 0.000
const 0.187 0.016 0.000 0.159 0.017 0.000
food 0.057 0.014 0.000 0.072 0.014 0.000
lumber 0.160 0.026 0.000 0.227 0.026 0.000
pulp 0.282 0.013 0.000 0.286 0.013 0.000
chemi 0.196 0.013 0.000 0.192 0.013 0.000
ceramic 0.075 0.015 0.000 0.077 0.015 0.000
iron 0.096 0.014 0.000 0.088 0.015 0.000
nonfer 0.069 0.013 0.000 0.072 0.014 0.000
fab_met -0.025 0.015 0.083 -0.029 0.015 0.053
machine 0.044 0.014 0.002 0.043 0.015 0.004
ele_mach 0.181 0.013 0.000 0.188 0.013 0.000
transp 0.100 0.013 0.000 0.105 0.013 0.000
precision 0.098 0.013 0.000 0.102 0.013 0.000
electricy 0.362 0.014 0.000 0.348 0.015 0.000
trans_com -0.086 0.023 0.000 -0.112 0.023 0.000
trade 0.119 0.014 0.000 0.097 0.015 0.000
finance 0.336 0.014 0.000 0.310 0.015 0.000
service 0.233 0.012 0.000 0.236 0.012 0.000
ln_size 0.045 0.002 0.000 0.042 0.002 0.000
_cons 2.438 0.007 0.000 1.996 0.019 0.000 1.686 0.028 0.000
Nobs 29771 29771 29771
F-value 6022.62 2268.91 1631.47
Adj-R2 0.6454 0.6884 0.697




             Table 4  Coefficients of Variations and Standard Deviations of Industry
                                              and Firm Size Wage Distributions
Explanatory Variables (Used Estimated Equation) C.V. Std.Dev. C.V. Std.Dev.
Woeker Characteristics+Indusries+Firm Size  0.101 0.972 0.037 0.399
   (Equation 4)
Worker Caracteristicse+Indusries+Firm Size+Firm  0.094 0.600 0.036 0.261






Total Effect    Wage Profile
(Bias) female experience tenure school         exp_hat
Industry Total 0.230 21.644 21.925 31.028 10.174 11.479 3.751
ln_size 0.014 0.000 -4.253 39.123 46.570 -3.230 21.789
Worker characteristics Other Firm
Characteristi
                                                                                   Share of Contributions(%
Table5   Effect of the Worker and Firm Characteristics on Industry/Size Coefficient  
 
 29Panel A Coef. Std.Err. P
exp_hat 0.657 0.181 0.000
exphat_age-24 -0.515 0.273 0.059
exphat_age25-29 -0.507 0.166 0.002
exphat_age35-39 1.482 0.177 0.000
exphat_age40-44 3.585 0.209 0.000
exphat_age45-49 6.025 0.241 0.000
exphat_age50-54 9.435 0.290 0.000




Panel B Coef. Std.Err. P Nobs F-value Adj-R2
- 24 0.969 0.383 0.011 1991 40.32 0.4535
25-29 0.280 0.282 0.321 4866 49.23 0.294
30-34 0.899 0.316 0.005 4657 68.58 0.3787
35-39 2.368 0.382 0.000 3928 67.4 0.4153
40-44 3.990 0.457 0.000 3233 80.45 0.508
45-49 6.690 0.473 0.000 3782 105.79 0.5379
50-54 8.899 0.501 0.000 4091 139.6 0.5873
55-59 14.160 0.739 0.000 2531 83.99 0.5794
group.
Note1: Panel. A shows the result of the wage equation using all the cross-
terms of exp_hat and age group. The reference group of the cross-terms is
with age 30-34. The estimated results of the other explanatory varibales are
ommitted.
Note2:Panel. B shows only the results on exp_hat obtained by estimations by ag
Table6  Wage Equations by age group
 
 30